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Abstract
This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and
politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the
institutional di¤erences between private, public and political organizations. In business,
when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively
moderate rst-best level of cronyism within a rm. The institutional framework of the
public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism
problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political
appointments (such that the subordinates reappointment is conditioned on the chiefs
re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme
case.
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1. Introduction
Cronyism is dened as partiality to long-standing friends, especially by appointing them to
positions of authority, regardless of their qualications. Cronyism is contrary in principle
to meritocracy, whereby appointments are made according to an individuals merits, such
as intelligence, credentials and education, determined through evaluation or examination.
Emerging empirical evidence has highlighted the practice of cronyism in both private and
public sectors (Kramarz and Thesmar 2007, Martins 2010, Scoppa 2009). Notable examples
of political cronyism include Warren G. Hardings nomination of long-standing friends as
cabinet members and John F. Kennedys appointment of Robert S. McNamara as Secretary
of Defense.
The literature contains several formal models of cronyism and favoritism. Prendergast and
Topel (1996) showed that a principal who values the power to a¤ect his subordinates welfare
does not necessarily appoint the most competent agents. Levine et al. (2007) emphasized
that if a rm owners preferences favor specic individuals, then too many ine¢ cient workers
may be employed. Montgomery (1991) and Taylor (2000) studied cronyism in hiring in the
presence of adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Egorov and Sonin (2011) showed
within a principal-agent framework that in dictatorships, in order to avoid betrayal, a weak
ruler will hire mediocre but loyal subordinates. Studies on family rms have investigated the
trade-o¤ between the competence of a hired manager and the loyalty of a family member
generally lacking that competence (Burkart et al. 2003, Caselli and Gennaioli 2006, Chami
2001).
This paper complements the aforementioned literature by studying the cronyism problem
in business, the public sector and politics. A two-tier agency problem with moral hazard is
built in which a principal delegates the control of an organization to an organization leader,
who in turn appoints agents to implement specic tasks within the organization. The leader
can choose an e¢ cient expert or a long-standing friend for each specic task. There is a
trade-o¤ here between e¢ ciency and social network benets. Experts are more e¢ cient
in performing organization tasks. Appointment of friends, however, implies certain private
benets for the leader (e.g., in terms of future job opportunities). The analysis is focused
on di¤erences in organizational structures and appointing procedures among business, the
public sector and politics. The model then compares the levels of business, bureaucratic and
political cronyism.
It is assumed that a top manager of a large corporation cares about her monetary payo¤s.
In business, therefore, when facing a residual claimant contract, a manager will appoint a rst-
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best number of experts within the rm. Note, however, that the rst-best does not involve
complete meritocracy: as long as a leader gains some private benets from appointing friends,
there will be a certain level of cronyism within the organization. In the public sector and
politics, wages are usually xed and publicly announced. The institutional structure does
not allow explicit contracts with bureaucrats and politicians. A bureaucrats main concern
then is job security, while a presidents main concern is re-election prospects. Both therefore
seek reappointment, which happens if the overall performance of the organization exceeds a
critical threshold. While under an explicit residual claimant contract a manager maximizes
the expected overall performance of the rm, under an implicit contract, a bureaucrat and a
politician want to guarantee that the overall performance of their organization exceeds the
minimum threshold needed for reappointment. Thus, the level of bureaucratic or political
cronyism will be higher than that of business cronyism.
Furthermore, political cronyism is more severe than bureaucratic cronyism. The reason
lies in a particular feature of political appointments described below. Consider a newly elected
president who forms her cabinet. It is common that the president nominates new ministers
and rarely reappoints incumbents (regardless of their performance). This tendency might also
exist in the public sector, but obviously not on the same scale as in politics. It is natural,
therefore, to assume that in cabinet, reappointment of ministers is conditioned on re-election
of the president. The ministers therefore realize that their reappointment depends not only
on their own performance, but also on the overall cabinet performance, which decreases their
incentives. As a result, a cabinet member exerts a lower e¤ort than a lower-tier bureaucrat
does. The overall cabinet performance is therefore less sensitive to a number of experts than
the overall performance of a public body. It follows that cronyism is more intense in politics
than in the public sector.
It must be stressed that in this framework the key di¤erence between bureaucracy and
politics is in appointment procedures for subordinates. In politics (but not in the public
sector), a subordinates reappointment is conditioned on the chiefs re-election. It is assumed,
however, that there is no crucial di¤erence between bureaucrats and politicians at the top
level: both are o¢ ce-motivated and seek reappointment, and thus are held accountable for
their past performance. Indeed, as pointed out by Maskin and Tirole (2004, p. 1036.), "the
requirement that o¢ cials run for reelection is not the only form of accountability . . . After
all, most appointed o¢ cials are accountable to their supervisors."
The paper borrows from the literature on political agency, starting with the seminal work
of Barro (1973) and followed by Ferejohn (1986), Persson et al. (1997), Austen-Smith and
Banks (1989), Banks and Sundaram (1993, 1996), and others. In this approach, elections
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are modeled as a disciplining device. Politicians want to be re-elected for another term, and
are held accountable for their past performance at the time of election. They therefore have
incentives to satisfy the principals wishes.
The literature also contains several models of bureaucratic delegation. In a seminal pa-
per, Rogo¤ (1985) emphasized the commitment benets of appointing an independent central
banker whose objective is ination-rate stabilization. Several authors contrasted elected o¢ -
cials (elected regulators, politicians) with non-elected o¢ cials (appointed regulators, judges,
bureaucrats) to study the allocation of decision-making powers in society (Besley and Coate
2003, Maskin and Tirole 2004, Alesina and Tabellini 2007, 2008). The appointed regulators
considered by Besley and Coate and the judges investigated by Maskin and Tirole were as-
sumed to have intrinsic motivations. The bureaucrats considered by Alesina and Tabellini are
motivated by career concerns, i.e., they are concerned with the perception of their ability by
their professional peers or the public at large. Section 3 includes some intuitions on how the
model predictions would change if a chief bureaucrat were concerned about public perception
of her leadership competence (rather than reappointment).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section
3 presents the formal analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Model
Consider an organization with an objective that implies implementation of n tasks. Think
of this as a rm, a public body or a cabinet of ministers, for example. In business, the tasks
might include control of human resources, monitoring of production process, innovation, and
advertising of nal output, among many others. In the public sector, an agency responsible
for, say, delivering social security faces tasks that include healthcare provision, ensuring
retirement security through the pension system, and supporting citizens with disabilities. In
politics, each minister of the cabinet deals with a particular task, such as defense, interior
a¤airs, foreign a¤airs, commerce, labor, transportation, education, etc.
It is assumed here that the nal output of an organization is determined by aggregate
task performance. Therefore, poor implementation of one task does not imply total failure
by the organization. For example, an unsuccessful advertising campaign will not destroy the
whole business. The social security agency might succeed in healthcare provision but fail in
implementing a new pension system. Finally, ine¤ective measures taken by, say, the ministry
of education for regulation of primary schools will not lead to cabinet removal.1
1Tasks within the organization might be complementary, and then a failure to implement one task could
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The organization leader delegates the tasks to n agents. Each agent i, i = 1; : : : ; n, exerts
an unobservable costly e¤ort ai  0 to implement his corresponding task. The leader observes
the performance of agent i, pi, with independent unobservable noise "i  N
 
0; 2

:
pi = ai + "i.
The overall performance of the organization, denoted by p, equals the sum of the perfor-
mances of all the agents:
p =
nX
i=1
pi:
The wage structure within the organization is assumed to be xed such that each agent
earns a xed salary. Indeed, within a rm it is impossible to make every employee a residual
claimant. An average manager is usually o¤ered a xed salary. In the public sector and
government, wages are publicly known and not negotiable. Moreover, it is assumed that the
contracts are temporary. An agents concern is therefore job retention, i.e., to be reappointed
to implement the task again. The agents independently choose e¤ort levels ai to maximize
their utility, given by
Pri (ai)  C (ai) ;
where Pri (ai) is the probability that i will be reappointed to implement the task, and C (ai)
denotes the cost for i of exerting e¤ort ai.
It is assumed that the leaders function within the organization is reduced to appointing
agents to implement the tasks.2 The leader will reappoint an agent i if his performance, pi,
exceeds a certain threshold. The leader realizes that the only alternative to reappointing
agents is to appoint new ones who will exert equilibrium e¤orts a0i (where a
0
i denotes the
leaders perception of ai). An optimal rule for reappointing agent i is therefore a cuto¤ rule
such that i is reappointed only if pi  a0i and is dismissed otherwise. Therefore,
Pri (ai) = P
 
pi  a0i
	
:
Consider now a situation in which the leader appoints agents for the rst time (so there are
no incumbents to be reappointed). For each task, the leader can choose either an expert E or
lead to collapse of the whole organization. Analysis of such a task structure is left for future research.
2The organization leader not only appoints the agents, but also, more importantly, provides guidance and
instructions and coordinates their work. However, the focus here is on an analysis of the problem of cronyism
within the organization. This is why it is assumed that the leaders unique task is to choose agents.
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a long-standing friend from her social network (a crony) F .3 An expert has widely recognized
extensive knowledge and ability based on education and experience for implementing a specic
task. E is therefore more e¢ cient in performing a task than any other individual. Formally,
this is modeled in terms of the agents cost of exerting an e¤ort ai: the e¤ort is assumed to
be cheaper for an expert than for a friend. The cost for friend F is given by CF (ai) =
a2i
2
while the cost for expert E is given by CE (ai) =
a2i
2c , where c > 1.
Appointment of a friend, however, implies some private benets for the organization leader
(e.g., in terms of future job opportunities). These benets are normalized to zero and it is
assumed that appointment of an expert involves an opportunity cost for the leader. Formally,
appointment of m = 0; : : : ; n experts generates the cost m
2
2 in terms of the leaders utility,
where  > 0 is a parameter of the cost function. It is reasonable to assume a convex cost in this
framework; indeed, appointment of each extra expert instead of a friend will be considered
increasingly less favorable in the leaders social network such that the leader could nally
lose all her contacts. Alternatively, this cost could arise because of a certain synergy between
the members of the same social network. For the leader, it might be easier to coordinate
the actions of her friends rather than those of independent experts. This interpretation is
particularly suitable in politics, in which policymakers from the same political party share
similar ideological views and therefore might easily come to an agreement on a specic policy
implementation.
In this simple framework, appointment of long-standing friends represents cronyism.
Cronies are less e¢ cient than experts are, but imply certain private benets for the or-
ganization leader. Appointment of experts represents meritocracy, since appointments are
made and responsibilities are assigned to individuals based on their merits, namely their
widely recognized e¢ ciency in performing tasks.
The reward for the leader, denoted by (p), depends on the overall performance of the
organization and varies depending on whether the leader is a chief executive of a rm, a chief
bureaucrat in a public agency or a president (or prime minister). The leader decides on a
number of experts to appoint, m, to maximize her net utility, which is given by
()  m
2
2
:
The function () is dened explicitly in the following sections.
The timing of events is as follows. First, the leader appoints agents by choosing between
3Note that the leader will face the same problem each time she dismisses an incumbent. It can easily
be shown that in equilibrium, the leader will appoint the same number of experts and cronies as she has
dismissed.
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experts and friends. Second, the agents exert e¤orts ai. Finally, nature chooses noise "i, the
performance pi of the agents is observed, and the rewards are paid.
First, I solve for the e¤orts ai. Second, I examine the leaders choice of a number of
experts and long-standing friends within the organization.
3. Analysis
Consider a benchmark case in which the leader owns the organization. She thus cares about
the expected overall performance, which implies (p) = Ep.
I analyze the agentsproblem rst. The utility of agent i is given by
Pri (ai)  C (ai) = P
 
pi  a0i
	  C (ai) = 1  F"i  a0i   ai  C (ai) ;
where F denotes the normal distribution function. Agent i exerts e¤ort ai before observing
realization of noise and taking the leaders expectations a0i as given. The rst-order condition
with respect to actual e¤ort ai is f"i (a
0
i   ai)   C 0 (ai) = 0, where f denotes the normal
distribution density function. After imposing the equilibrium requirements a0i = ai, I obtain
the equilibrium e¤ort of an expert aE and that of a leaders friend aF . The result is established
in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The equilibrium e¤ort of an expert, aE , and that of a leaders friend, aF , are
equal to
aE =
cp
2
;
aF =
1p
2
:
In this simple framework, the equilibrium e¤orts of agents do not depend on the number
of experts and leaders friends in the organization. The reason is that the leader evaluates
each subordinate only for his own performance, which is not a¤ected by the performance
of other agents. As expected, an expert makes a greater e¤ort than a leaders friend does
(aE > aF ) since the e¤ort is less costly for him. A greater variance 2 of the noise decreases
the agents e¤orts. Intuitively, more randomness in the observed performances pi makes
the reappointment probability less sensitive to e¤ort, reducing the agents incentives. To
guarantee that the agentsparticipation constraint holds, the following condition is required:
c  22.
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I now analyze the choice of a leader who owns the organization. The leader appoints m
experts and n m friends to maximize her expected utility, given by
Ep  m
2
2
= maE + (n m) aF   m
2
2
=
m (c  1) + np
2
  m
2
2
:
The rst-order condition with respect to m yields a rst-best number of experts within the
organization, m. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 1. The rst-best number of experts within the organization is
m =
c  1p
2
:
To guarantee that m  n, the following condition must hold: c  1 + p2n. For
simplicity, the integer problem is disregarded throughout the paper.4
From an e¢ ciency point of view, only experts should be appointed to perform the tasks.
However, even in the rst-best equilibrium there are cronies appointed for some tasks: m is
strictly positive. The reason is that there is always a trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and social
network benets: e¢ ciency requires the appointment of experts, while social network benets
require the appointment of cronies.
Intuitively, the more e¢ cient the experts are (the higher c) the more experts would be
appointed: dm

dc > 0. Moreover, the number of experts within the organization decreases
with the variance 2 of the noise. As mentioned above, greater variance 2 decreases the
agents e¤orts and therefore the overall performance of the organization. Appointment of
cronies thus becomes even more attractive to the leader. Finally, the more private benets
the leader gains by appointing friends (the higher  is), the fewer experts and the more cronies
will be chosen for task implementation: dm

d < 0.
After considering a rst-best scenario, I turn to analysis of a more realistic situation in
which a principal delegates management of the organization to a leader. This is then a two-
tier agency problem. First, a principal delegates to the organization leader governance of the
organization and second, the leader delegates to the agents the implementation of the tasks.
In business, a principal is a rms owner and the organization leader is the chief executive
or chief manager. In the public sector, a principal is the highest-ranked public authority (or
government) coordinating all public activities such as delivering social security, administering
national planning or organizing national defense. The organization leader is then a chief
4Then m
n
can be interpreted as the probability of appointing an expert or a proportion of experts within
the organization.
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bureaucrat responsible for, say, social security. In politics, a principal is a representative
voter who delegates to a president (or prime minister) the implementation of policies.
Regardless of the leader type, a principals objective is to maximize the overall perfor-
mance of the organization, p. The leaders reward () varies depending on whether the
leader is a chief executive of a rm, a chief bureaucrat in a public agency or a president
(or prime minister). In the following subsections, I present analyses for di¤erent types of
organization leader (manager, bureaucrat and politician).
3.1. Cronyism in Business
This subsection considers a rm owner who delegates management of the rm to a manager.
The agentsproblem is identical to that in Section 3. Lemma 1 species the equilibrium e¤ort
of an expert and that of a managers friend.
The manager cares about her wage w and chooses a number of experts to maximize her
net utility, given by
w   m
2
2
:
I suppose that the overall performance p is contractible. It is known from contract theory
that the rst-best can be achieved by an optimal explicit contract rewarding the manager
with a simple linear payo¤ based on the overall performance:
w = p  :
The constant  is found from the managers ex-ante participation constraint, given by:
Ep    m
2
2
=
m (c  1) + np
2
    m
2
2
:
Under an optimal contract, the participation constraint will bind, yielding
 =
mM (c  1) + np
2
  m
M2
2
;
where mM denotes the number of experts appointed by the manager. The following propo-
sition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2. A manager appoints a rst-best number of experts within the organization:
mM = m =
c  1p
2
:
In business, a residual claimant contract is a powerful tool for ensuring the rst-best. By
making the manager a residual claimant, the rms owner guarantees the rst-best number
of experts appointed for task implementation. The manager still chooses a certain number
of cronies. There is no way of motivating her to appoint e¢ cient experts to all n tasks.
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3.2. Cronyism in the Public Sector
Consider now the problem of a highest-ranked public authority (or government) that delegates
the governance of a public body to a bureaucrat. The agentsproblem is the same as in Section
3, so the agentsequilibrium e¤orts are specied in Lemma 1.
I suppose that the wage in the public sector is xed and that contracts are temporary.
The chief bureaucrat is therefore concerned about her job security, i.e., she wants to retain her
job and to be reappointed to govern the public organization in the future. The bureaucrats
net utility is then
Pr (p)  m
2
2
;
where Pr (p) denotes the probability of the bureaucrat being reappointed for public service.
The overall performance of the public organization, p, is not contractible. Indeed, re-
warding public sector performance with explicit contracts is hard to imagine. The principal
therefore adopts implicit contracting to motivate the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat will be
reappointed if the organization performance p exceeds a certain threshold. The only alter-
native to reappointing the bureaucrat is to delegate the governance of the public body to
another bureaucrat who will choose an equilibrium number of experts m0 (where m0 denotes
the principals perception of m). It follows that the bureaucrat will be reappointed only
if p  m0aE + (n m0) aF = m0(c 1)+np
2
. The following proposition establishes the results
for the number of experts appointed by the bureaucrat, mB. (The proof of this and other
propositions can be found in the Appendix.)
Proposition 3. The number of experts appointed by the bureaucrat is given by
mB =
c  1
22
p
n
:
The condition c  min
h
1 + 22
p

p
n; 1 + 22
p
n3
i
ensures that the bureaucrats
participation constraint is satised and that mB  n. As in the rst-best case, the more
e¢ cient the experts are, the more of them will be appointed instead of cronies for task
implementation: dm
B
dc > 0. A greater variance 
2 of the noise decreases the agentse¤orts and
thus the number of experts within the public body. The higher the bureaucrats opportunity
cost of appointing experts (instead of friends), the fewer of them will be chosen for task
implementation: dm
B
d < 0.
Note, moreover, that the bureaucrats choice is also a¤ected by the number of tasks to be
implemented. Indeed, the more tasks there are in the public organization, the fewer experts
and more cronies would be appointed by the bureaucrat: dm
B
dn < 0. The reason is that
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the agentsperformances on task implementation are observed with independent noise "i.
The more tasks there are to implement (the higher n is), the more randomness there is in
the observed overall performance of the public body, p. This makes the chief bureaucrats
reappointment probability less sensitive to the agentse¢ ciency. As a result, appointment of
cronies (instead of experts) becomes more attractive for the bureaucrat.
3.3. Cronyism in Politics
This subsection analyzes the delegation problem in politics when a president forms a cabinet of
ministers to implement policies on behalf of a representative voter. I rst consider the agents
(the ministers) problem and then address the presidents choice of experts and cronies within
the cabinet.
As in private and public sectors, the subordinates here want to be reappointed to imple-
ment the tasks again. In politics, however, each president usually forms a new cabinet from
scratch, and appoints new ministers regardless of the incumbentsperformance. It is then
reasonable to assume that a ministers reappointment depends not only on his own perfor-
mance, but also on the presidents re-election. The representative voter is rational and thus
realizes that the only alternative to re-electing the president is to elect an opponent who will
choose an equilibrium number of experts m0 (where m0 denotes the voters perception of m)
generating an overall performance p0. Therefore, the president will be re-elected if p  p0.
The probability of minister i being reappointed is thus equal to
Pri (ai) = P
 
pi  a0i
	 \ p  p0	 :
The following proposition species the equilibrium e¤orts of the cabinet members.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium e¤ort of an expert, aE , and that of a presidents friend,
aF , within the cabinet of ministers are given by
aE =
c (1 +
p
n)
2
p
2n
;
aF =
1 +
p
n
2
p
2n
:
The condition c  8n2
(1+
p
n)
2

1
2 +
1
 arctan
1p
n 1

guarantees that the ministersparticipa-
tion constraints hold.
As intuition suggests, an e¢ cient expert exerts a higher e¤ort than a crony does: aE >
aF . Moreover, the more random the observed performance is (the higher 2 is), the less
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sensitive is the ministersreappointment probability to e¤ort, which decreases the ministers
incentives. Note, moreover, that the ministerse¤orts decrease with a number of tasks n to
be implemented. The reason is that task implementations are observed with independent
noise "i. The more tasks there are (the higher n is), the more random the observed overall
performance of the cabinet is, which makes the presidents re-election probability less sensitive
to the ministers e¤orts. Moreover, there is a free-riding problem here. Intuitively, each
minister realizes that the presidents re-election depends on the overall performance of the
cabinet, and would like to free-ride on his counterparts performance and save a cost of
exerting e¤ort. The more ministers there are in the cabinet, the more severe is the free-riding
problem and the less e¤ort each minister will make.
How do the ministerse¤orts compare with those of employees in the private and public
sectors? The following lemma establishes the result. (The proof is straightforward.)
Lemma 2. The cabinet members exert less e¤ort than employees working in the private and
public sectors:
aE > aE ;
aF > aF .
As discussed above, in business and the public sector, a subordinates reappointment is
determined only by his own performance. A subordinates reward is therefore very sensitive
to his own e¤ort. In politics, however, a ministers reappointment is possible only if the
president is re-elected for a subsequent term. Each ministers reward is then a¤ected by the
performance of the entire cabinet and is less sensitive to his own e¤ort, which reduces his
incentives. A free-riding problem arises here. Each politician would like to save a costly
e¤ort and wants his counterparts to ensure successful cabinet performance and therefore the
presidents re-election.
I now address the presidents problem of appointing cabinet members. The presidents
goal is to be re-elected, which occurs if the overall cabinet performance p exceeds a critical
threshold. If the president is thrown out of o¢ ce, a newly elected opponent will choose
an equilibrium number of experts m0 who generate the expected cabinet performance p0 
m0aE + (n m0) aF (where m0 and p0 denote a voters perception of m and p, respectively).
The voter is rational and thus compares the actual cabinet performance p with the expected
performance p0 of a potential cabinet and votes accordingly. The presidents objective function
is thus given by
P
 
p  p0	  m2
2
:
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The following proposition species the equilibrium number of experts appointed by the pres-
ident within the cabinet of ministers.
Proposition 5. The number of experts appointed by the president within the cabinet, mP ,
is equal to
mP =
(1 +
p
n) (c  1)
42n
:
To guarantee the presidents participation constraint and that mP  n, it is required that
c  min
h
1 + 4
2
p
n
1+
p
n
; 1 + 4
2n2
1+
p
n
i
. As in business and the public sector, the more e¢ cient
the experts are (the higher c is), the more of them will be appointed instead of cronies within
the cabinet of ministers. A greater variance 2 of noise leads to more randomness in the
observed cabinet performance and therefore decreases the presidents re-election probability.
As a result, the president will appoint more friends and fewer experts. The higher the
opportunity cost of appointing experts (the higher  is), the fewer of them will be chosen
by the president in the cabinet. As the bureaucrat does, the president chooses fewer experts
and more cronies the more tasks there are to implement within the cabinet: dm
P
dn < 0. As
in the public sector, the agentsperformances are observed with independent noise. Thus,
the more tasks there are, the more random is the overall cabinet performance. This implies
that the presidents re-election probability decreases with the number of tasks. The president
becomes even more eager to appoint friends instead of experts. Moreover, in politics, there
is one more reason to appoint friends when the number of tasks increases. As was shown
above, the ministerse¤orts (and therefore the overall cabinet performance) decrease with the
number of tasks n to be implemented. The presidents re-election probability decreases and
appointment of cronies (instead of experts) becomes even more appealing to the president.
3.4. Cronyism Problem
How does the number of experts appointed by a manager, chief bureaucrat or president di¤er
from the rst-best number of experts? The following lemma establishes the result. (The proof
is straightforward using the condition for the agentsparticipation constraint c  22).
Lemma 3. A manager appoints a rst-best number of experts within a rm. A bureaucrat
appoints fewer experts than is socially optimal in a public body. A president chooses even
fewer experts for her cabinet than a bureaucrat does. Formally,
m = mM > mB > mP :
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The cronyism problem is therefore the most severe in politics: a president appoints much
more friends in her cabinet than is socially optimal. In the public sector, cronyism arises on
a smaller scale than in politics. In business, powerful residual claimant contracts can solve
the cronyism problem such that the number of cronies within a rm is socially optimal. Note
that the rst-best is referred to as a social optimum. Alternatively, it can be argued that in
a social optimum there should be no cronies appointed in place of e¢ cient experts. Indeed,
why should the leaders private benets from appointing cronies be taken into account in a
societys aggregate welfare function? The most important factor is the overall organization
performance. If a reader shares this viewpoint, then the model results are quite disappointing:
complete meritocracy is never reacheda number of cronies would be always appointed in
business, the public sector and politics.5
Why is business cronyism not as strong as bureaucratic or political cronyism? The leaders
preferences are the key. The manager cares about her monetary reward. When o¤ered a
residual claimant contract, she chooses the number of experts that maximizes the expected
overall performance of the rm net of opportunity cost of appointing experts. The bureaucrat
or politician, in turn, wants to be reappointed (re-elected), and thus appoints the minimum
number of experts su¢ cient to ensure that the overall organization performance exceeds the
threshold needed for reappointment. As a result, a manager has less tendency to appoint
cronies than a bureaucrat or politician does.
How does bureaucratic cronyism compare with political cronyism? In the simple frame-
work here, the chief bureaucrat of a public organization and a president share the same
preferencesthey seek reappointment. The explanation lies then in the key di¤erence be-
tween the functioning of a public body and a cabinet of ministers. A president nominates
cabinet ministers, who are appointed with legislature approval. This procedure itself implies
that each new president forms her own cabinet, rarely reappointing incumbent ministers (re-
gardless of their performance). In the public sector, there is no such practicea new chief
bureaucrat is not supposed to nominate lower-tier bureaucrats. It might obviously happen
that a newly appointed chief bureaucrat will substitute some subordinates who have failed
in their tasks. This scenario is in line with the model here. This core disparity between
the functioning of a public organization and that of a cabinet of ministers implies di¤erent
incentives between cabinet ministers and public employees. Indeed, a minister realizes that
his reappointment is possible only if a president is re-elected. The ministers reappointment
is thus conditioned on the presidents re-election, which makes the ministers reward less
5 In making this statement, I consider strictly positive values for the leaders opportunity cost of appointing
experts, m
2
2
. If this cost is negligibly small, meritocracy will be achieved.
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sensitive to his own e¤ort and decreases his incentives to perform well. However, a lower-tier
bureaucrat might be reappointed solely because of his good performance, regardless of his
chiefs reappointment or dismissal. He therefore will make more e¤ort than a cabinet minister
does. Owing to these incentives issues, the performance of a lower-tier bureaucrat in a public
agency is expected to be higher than that of a cabinet member. As a result, a marginal ex-
pert within a public body increases the reappointment probability of a chief bureaucrat more
than a marginal expert within a cabinet of ministers increases the re-election probability of a
president. A chief bureaucrat will therefore tend to appoint more experts and fewer cronies
than a president does.
It must be stressed that this model captures just one particular case of the preferences of
bureaucrats and politiciansboth just want to keep their jobs and be reappointed. Alterna-
tively, a high-level bureaucrat (e.g., central bank governor) or a president (particularly in her
last term) could be concerned about the perception of her leadership competence by those
who might o¤er her alternative job opportunities.6 Intuitively, in this simple framework, lead-
ership competence would be evaluated in terms of the expected overall performance of the
organization, Ep. It follows then that a rst-best level of meritocracy, m, can be achieved in
the public sector. It must be emphasized, however, that such preferences are not particularly
relevant for a representative bureaucrat: job security concerns seem to dictate the behavior
of the average bureaucrat.
Another issue disregarded here is promotion opportunities within an organization. Con-
ditioned on successful task implementation, agents might be promoted to the position of
organization leader in business or the public sector. In politics, a successful cabinet member
might win the next presidential election. Intuition suggests that promotion opportunities will
give extra incentives for subordinates to exert e¤ort. However, the level of cronyism within
the organization is expected to increase as the leader will tend to appoint ine¢ cient cronies
who are less likely to challenge her leadership.7 Formal analysis of this scenario is left for
future research.
4. Conclusion
This paper seeks to capture key di¤erences between cronyism in business, the public sector
and politics. I consider a two-tier agency problem with moral hazard, in which a principal
6Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008) made this assumption.
7Egorov and Sonin (2011) formalize a principal-agent model in which a dictator chooses a mediocre but
loyal vizier to avoid treason.
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delegates to the organization leader governance of the entire organization, while the leader
appoints lower-tier agents to perform specic tasks. For each task, an e¢ cient expert or a
leaders long-standing friend can be chosen. Appointment of friends implies certain private
benets for the organization leader.
The analysis rests on fundamental assumptions about the leaders preferences and ap-
pointment procedures within a rm, a bureaucratic organization or a cabinet of ministers.
In particular, it is assumed that a chief manager of a rm cares about her monetary payo¤s,
while a chief bureaucrat of a public body and a president want to be reappointed. Then, fac-
ing a residual claimant contract, a manager appoints the rst-best number of experts within
the rm. As for a bureaucrat and president, they choose the minimum number of experts suf-
cient to guarantee that the overall organization performance exceeds the threshold needed
for reappointment or re-election. It follows then that the level of cronyism in business is
lower than that in the public sector or politics. However, as long as an organization leader
gains some private benets from appointment of cronies, complete meritocracy will be never
achieved.
I also show that political cronyism is more severe than bureaucratic cronyism, as a presi-
dent tends to appoint more cronies and fewer experts within her cabinet than a chief bureau-
crat within a public body. A key explanation for this result is a particular feature of political
appointments, such that a new political leader prefers to form her team from scratch and
rarely reappoints incumbents who served under her predecessor. It follows then that cabinet
ministers have a chance of staying in o¢ ce only if the president is re-elected, which happens
if the overall performance of the whole cabinet exceeds a critical threshold. This in turn
weakens the ministers incentives and thus the performance of a lower-tier bureaucrat in a
public body exceeds that of a member of the presidents cabinet. The reward of a chief bu-
reaucrat is thus more sensitive to the number of experts within the organization than that
of a president. This leads to higher levels of political than of bureaucratic cronyism.
This paper focused on a particular organization structure with no overlap between tasks
nor synergy between agents. It would be of interest to relax these assumptions and study
a more general framework in which, say, owing to synergy, two long-standing friends can
outperform two experts or experts are particularly e¢ cient in performing overlapping tasks
in their specic competence area. Another potential extension is to assume that the tasks
are exposed to the same shock, which would imply less randomness in the observed overall
performance of the organization. These extensions are left for future research.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 3
The bureaucrat is reappointed if p  m0(c 1)+np
2
or
Pn
i=1 "i  m
0(c 1)+np
2
  m(c 1)+np
2
=
(m0 m)(c 1)p
2
. Denote
Pn
i=1 "i by b": b" Pni=1 "i. By convolution formula, the sum of normally
distributed random variables is a normally distributed random variable, so b"  N  0; n2.
The bureaucrats utility is equal to
P
b"  (m0  m) (c  1)p
2

  m
2
2
= 1  Fb"

(m0  m) (c  1)p
2

  m
2
2
:
The rst-order condition with respect to m, taking m0 as given, is
fb"

(m0  m) (c  1)p
2

c  1p
2
 m = 0:
Imposing the equilibrium requirement m0 = m yields the number of experts appointed by the
bureaucrat, mB:
mB =
c  1
22
p
n
:
For the bureaucrats participation constraint to be satised, the following condition is required
to hold: c  1 + 22ppn. Moreover, to guarantee that mB  n, it is required that
c  1 + 22
p
n3.
B. Proof of Proposition 4
The utility of minister i is given by
P
 
pi  a0i
	 \ p  p0	  C (ai) = P  "i  a0i   ai	 \
(b"  p0   ai  P
j 6=i
aj
)!
  C (ai) ;
where b"  Pni=1 "i. The density function of a bivariate normal distribution of random
variables "i and b", denoted by f"i;b" (x; y), is
f"i;b" (x; y) = 122pn  1 exp
(
  x
2
22
  (y   x)
2
2 (n  1)2
)
:
The minister is objective function then becomes
+1Z
a0i ai
266664
+1Z
p0 ai 
P
j 6=i
aj
f"i;b" (x; y) dy
377775 dx  C (ai) :
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Minister i chooses e¤ort ai, taking a0i and p
0 as given. The rst-order condition is equal to
+1Z
p0 ai 
P
j 6=i
aj
f"i;b"  a0i   ai; y dy + +1Z
a0i ai
f"i;b"
 
x; p0   ai  
P
j 6=i
aj
!
dx  C 0 (ai) = 0:
Imposing the equilibrium requirements a0i = ai and p
0 =
nP
j=1
aj yields minister is equilibrium
e¤ort ai, dened implicitly by:
1 +
p
n
2
p
2n
= C 0 (ai) :
The equilibrium probability of minister i being reappointed is equal to
+1Z
0
+1Z
0
f"i;b" (x; y) dydx = 14 +
1
2
arctan
1p
n  1 ;
where arctan () is the arctangent function. Therefore, the ministersparticipation constraint
is
1
4
+
1
2
arctan
1p
n  1   C (ai)  0:
C. Proof of Proposition 5
The president is reelected only if p  p0 where p0  m0aE + (n m0) aF = (1+
p
n)(m0(c 1)+n)
2
p
2n
.
The presidents utility then can be rewritten as
P
b"  (1 +pn) (m0 (c  1) + n)
2
p
2n
  (1 +
p
n) (m (c  1) + n)
2
p
2n

  m
2
2
=
1  Fb"

(1 +
p
n) (c  1) (m0  m)
2
p
2n

  m
2
2
;
where b"  Pni=1 "i  N  0; n2. The rst-order condition with respect to m, taking m0 as
given, is
fb"

(1 +
p
n) (c  1) (m0  m)
2
p
2n

(1 +
p
n) (c  1)
2
p
2n
 m = 0:
Imposing the equilibrium requirement m0 = m yields the number of experts appointed by the
president, mP :
mP =
(1 +
p
n) (c  1)
42n
:
The presidents participation constraint is satised if c  1+ 42
p
n
1+
p
n
. Moreover, to guarantee
that mP  n, it is required that c  1 + 42n2
1+
p
n
.
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